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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif f-Rr spondr nt,

Case No.

-vs-

10772

LA \VRENCE MACK HOLT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF

CASI~

This is a criminal appeal from a verdict and jnd~- '
ment of First Degree Murder with recommendation of
leniency. The defendant ·was sentenced to life imprisonment by Aldon J. Anderson, Judw~, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The defendant 'vas sPnt0nced
at the Utah State Prison following
leniency by the jury. SentrncL~ was
Anderson, Jndg0, 1-'hircl .Jndicial
County, State of Utah.

to life imprisonment
a recommendation of
impotSed by Aldon J. '
Distrirt, Salt Lake

')

'""'

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
'!'he• appellenat seeks reversal of the judgment and
cmffiction of First Degree Murder or in the alternative,
a rrduction of the charge to Second Degree Murder. Furtlirr i11 the alt0rnative, th0 appellant se0ks a reversal and
rPmand for a new trial.
STATiiJ.l\H~NT

OF FACTS

011 .July 14, 19GG,, one Bernice King was shot to death
in a hack alh~y located bPhind the Clark's Cafeteria in the
Pnu1Pntia1 Bank Building, 33rd South and State Street,
Salt Lake City, State of Utah. (T-196) The body was
disrov0r<·d hy Barr Petersen, Deputy Sheriff of Salt Lake
Cottnl.\ at 9 :00 p.m. Also present at the scene of the
:;hooting \rns one Richanl Allen, who also had received
a gun sltot wonnd in the shoulder. (T-367) The cause of
<l<•ath of Bc'rnice lGng was bullet wounds to the brain.
('l'-218)

On tlw clay of the shooting, the defendant was observ,•d hy Uden Virginia Smith at the Crest Club where
tl11, latt(•r wa::-; a bartender. She had been acquainted with
!Lt> d\•frmlant and the victim for several years and was
awan• that the t1rn had been going together for the past
tltr('(' yc•an.:. ( 'l'-325)
'l'lH' d<'frndant had been in the Crest Club twice on
!

i1" ;1 !'h'!'110011

of the daY of tlw shooting. The bartender
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last observed the defendant at G:00 p.m. when she got off
work. (T-328) The defcndant had been drinking that
afternoon. He called the bartender at her home at abont
7 :30 p.m. of the same day and had app<~ared to be upset,
in a bad mood and feeling bad. (T-330) The ddendant
wasn't himself. ('T-344) She received anothPr phonP
call later that evening ·whrrC'in the ddendant stated that
he had shot Bernice~ twice. ('l'-332)
Just prior to the shooting, the dPceased had phoned
Richard Allen, a person whom she had apparPntl~- }irfriended as a fellow employee and asked that he pirk hrr
up because she was "a little troubled." (T-365) She was
employed at the Clark's Cafetc'ria and ·was to g<'t off
work at 9 :00 p.m. (T-3G5a) l\Ir. Allf'n respondC'd to her
request and went to pick her np at ·which time he ohsen r·rl
two people strnggling in the alley. As he pulled closer, h~
recognized the two people as the ddC'ndant and Bernicl'
King. (T-366) He ohs0rved that the defendant had a
gun. He got out of his car and attC'mpted to stop tl11·
defendant. The defendant fired the first shot into the
head of the deceased; turned and fired at Richard Allen
striking him in the shoulder; tmnPd and fired the second
shot into the head of the deceased. CC-367) Mr. Allrn
stated that he told the clt•frndant to "takP it out on him."
(T-3G7)
After tlw shootjng, tlw ddrrnbnt was sePn running
from the scrnP hy th<> siskr-in-law of tJie deceased. ~he
;.;aw him rmminµ: east out of the pnrki11p; lot, thnrnp;h th:
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hack window of her antomobile while it \Vas parked at
tl1r A & Y'.T Drive Inn, across the street from the Clark's
Cafeteria. (T-317)
8ometime after 9 :00 p.m. the defendant arrived at
tlw Clayb1irn residence and inquired if the parents were
home. He appear<'d npset and stated that he just shot
a la<ly. ( T-271) He made a couple of phone calls and
left between 10 :00-10 :30 p.m. exhibiting no signs of intoxication. (T-276) Two other phone calls were made to
Dnam• Rrinhrhoff about l1 :00 p.m. and the defendant's
voice was sharper and qnicker and sounded excited.
('l'-48G, 487)
'11 IH' defrndant left town and checked into the Stuart's

jfokl, in Brigham City on the night of the shooting.
('r-2i':iG) 'rhe registration of the car checked with the
n·gil'tration of the car owned by the defendant at the
tirnP of tlw shooting. (T-256-263) The exact arrival time
was unknown. (T-258) The next morning the defendant
r<'hm10J to the residence of one Henry Simmonetti, a
friPnd of some 17-lS y<:>ars. (rr-351) He informed Mr.
f..;onunindti of his actions and turned the weapon and
0liE·lls OHr to him. (T-351) At this time, the defendant
'~1J]learf•d awfnl shaky. He broke down and started to
er:,-. (rL -~1:n) 'l1lw d<'fcndant remained in this condition for
a jJ<Tiod of 3-4 hours in the presence of Mr. Simmonetti
:111d Dna11<• Brinkerhoff, who subsequently arrived. (T+;·~ l TlH·reaft<"r, the> ddendant, in the company of the
1

5
two aforesaid rwrsons, went to the Salt Lake City Police
station and turned himself in and smTE~ndered thr guu
and shells. (T-358)
The defendant had pnrchased the gun on the 15tl:
day of March, l!JGG for tl1e pnrpose of giving it to his
·wife. (T-254) The 1veapon ·was described as a .32 antomatic on the sales slip (Exhihit 29) and the police permit
(Exhibit 321). CC-24G) The three ex1wnded shells fonnd
at the scene of the crinw also canw from a .:-32 ealilwr
>1-eapon. (T-234)
The brother-in-law of the d<'ceasecl testifi0d that thr
defendant had made threats against the deceased some
three weeks hefon.• at the Hickory Pit Cafe, stating that
"she would be sorry."
Mary Lou Lemon was called to testify that she had
met the defendant four days before the shooting and had
been -with the defendant at Demman's Golf course and observed a gun in the glo1·e compartment of the defrndant's
car. (T-348) Furtlwr, she testified that she had a brothrrin-law on the Slwriff's Department and had n~fused to go
out vvith the defendant on the dav of the shooting at abont
6 :00 p.rn. because she had heard that the defendant didn't
have too good of character reference to be going out with
at that timP. ('r-3J8) During tltis conversation, the dl'fcndant told her that he 1rns going to get t-Nen with a fc\\'
people before lO :00 that night. (T-:3;)0)

G

The ddcndant was in love ·with the deceased and had
li1•en going ·with her for a pc:riod of three years. ( T-325,
) Dnring the period of this r<~lationshi!J, he and the
rh·casC'd 11ad O]Wned a joint saving and cheeking acconnt,
at ·walker Dank and Trust. (T-477) He was dependent
npnn the deceased becansr~ he couldn't write or read.
('r-33G) He had imrcliasPd a Pontiac for the deceased,
(1'-'.334) together ·with othC'r clothing and food. (T-::342)
The relationship had broken clo-wn and the defendant lost
\l'('ight, became moody, and lwgan drinking excessively.
(1'-33())

On tlw day of the incident, the defendant appeared
to \rnnt to talk to HPlen Yirginia Smith, the bartender of
tlir Cn:st Club. HP appeared nervons, fidgety, upset, and

rried. ('11-340) Most of the conversation was about the
rkwa~t·d and his co11ycrsai:ions with the deceased. (T-342)
On fop aftl'moon of tlw incident, the defendant went
ont to fop \Valk«r Bank and presented a withdrawal slip
for $:-300.00 on the joint account. ( T-'!65) He appeared
0motionnll:,- upset and ldt without getting the money.
Miss Bdty Paxon, teller, testified that she had to call the
1l(·[r·ndant bade and gi\-(~ the defendant th0 money wherel~!JOil lH• stated that he wanted it transferred to the check1
; 'l'l' ae<'ount. ( '1 -4G5) The defendant's conduct exhibited
·1 t11tal unfamiliarity with hm1king procedure. (T-46G)
1
~<lr] .fon .·s, manager of the office. testified as to the pror·, iJ111(· i'or opening· an account and the signature card.
1
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(Exhibit 37). T11e sm·ing account ledger (Exhihit 3(
deposit slips, (Exhibit 38) and ·withdrawal slips (Exhil
39) were introdnced into evidence. (T-473--175)

Doctors Louis G. Moench and ·William D. Pace, ps:
chiatrists, were cullrd by the defendant to establish ti
defense of insanity. Both had examined the defendant o
the 5th day of J nly, 19G6. Doctor Jlifoench is a grad11ate c
the University of Chicago School of Medicine, intern an
residence at the L.D.S. Hosriital in Salt Lake City, rPs
dency in psychiatry, McLran Hospital and residrnt i
psychiatry at Lanporter Clinic at the University of Cali
fornia. He is a member and past president of the Uta
Psychiatric Association. He has practiced his sprcialt:
of psychiatry for the imst 20 ~-ears and has ~·xaminc1
th011sands of patients. ('r-39:)-:~94)

On Jnly 5, 19G6, Doctor Mo0nch conducted a 1\fenta
Statns examination which consiskd of a medical am
psychiatric history, family and social history, reviPw ol
the events for which the defendant was brought hefol'f
the court. (T-393) This examination is desig1wd to tesi
the person's assessment of reality at the time of the examination and to make an estimate of his intellectual
capacity. (rr-394) This inclucl('d a diagnosis as to thr·
defrndant's mental condition as of the time of th<> incident.
(T-394) At the time-' of the shooting, the defendant'~- con
di tion was "acnte associative' rdati011," which "r('prl'sent'
a dissociation or separation of a p('r:-;on ':-; awnn•1w~~ 11 1

8
n·ality and a dissociation and a separation of his thinking,
frding, and acting, so that they are not entirely coordinated." (r_C-396) Further, at the time of the shooting, it
was the psychiatrist's opinion that the defendant was
insane; (rr-397) that "his knowledge of the rightness or
wrongness was seriously impaired; (T-397) the defendant's awareness of the nature and quality of his acts was
seriously impaired; (T-397) that the defendant's capacity
to adhen~ to the right due to some mental condition was
"\'ery seriously impaired." (T-398) The psychiatrist's
opinion indicated that the defendant would have committ('d the act in the presence of policemen with guns drawn.
(T-398) Further, it was his opinion that the defendant
was seven~ly disorganized, for approximately a week
prior to the incident. (T-398) The defendant's condition
wu:- deemt>d as tm1porary insanity. (T-399)
Doctor Moench further stated that in his opinion the
rMeBdant's capacity to form a specific intent to kill, or
hi~ ability to make a choice to kill or not to kill, or his
ability to develop the intent to create great bodily injury
was sPrionsly impaired, though not impossible. (T-431432)
Dr. William D. Pace, another psychiatrist, substantiafrd Doctor Moench's testimony and opinions. Doctor

l'arc• n::amined the defendant separately on the 6th day
o['
1,'!

1

.l uly, 19G6 utilizing the Mental Status examination.
"n-l) At the time of his examination he discovered "a

9

mental condition or disorder exish•d and tlwre was smm
indication of its continuance." ( T-435) His diagnosis at
this time was "psychotic rraction in an emotionally n11 .
stable, inadequate and disorganiz<~d individual with a
poor tolerance of alcohol." (T-435) "A psychotic reactiol!
refers to a mental disorder vvhich is characteriz(•d by 0 11~
or all of an order of ef foct or mood changes in thinkinK
and behavior, in some casc,s VC'ry often withdrmval from
reality and a tendency to operat<~ on the basis of selfcenten•d thinking or behavior rather than what is goin~
on abont them." ('r-4~5)
Using psychosis and insanity interchangeably, tlw
psychiatrist testified that in his opinion the defendant
was psychotic at the time of the commission of the offense.
(T-43G) Fnrther, it was his opinion that at the tirne of
the commission of the offense, the defendant could noi
make the distinction between the right and wrongn('s~ of
the act according to law and rnoral8; and that, dne to
the "mental illness," the defrndant lach•d the capacity
to deliberate and plan to kill. (T'-4:~8) He did not thillk
that "there was any deliberation in reaching a decision
on his part on that basis." (rl.'-438) His opinion was based
upon what the d(•f enclant had told him an cl on '"hat lw
obsc•rved in the way tlw dd'endant told him ahont tlie~l'
things. (T-438) Moreover, the dcf Pndant was found to lll'
"substantially below averag<' int<·lligence." ('11 -438) In tlw
doctor's judgment, he had :-;nfficient information to arriw
at an ovinion witlHrnt the nPecssit~· of an~· furtht>r 11sycl10logical test, includillg a Hosclta('h t"~~t. (T-~1G7)

10
\\'hen confronted with the prosecutor's question repm1ing tlie presence of a police officer with his guns
dn11rn, it ·was the doctor's opinion that the defendant
11·ould take> anoth<~r step toward the decPased in spite of
the officer's threat that he would shoot if the defendant
took anotlwr step. (T-450) Again on cross-examination,
the psychiatrist stated that it was his opinion that the
defendant was not thinking at the time that if he pulled
thr trigger wlwn it was up against the deceased's head
that it 1rnuld cause grPat bodily injnry or probable death.
('r-45:3-454) Rather, h(• descrilws the defendant's mental
condition as "a disorgani~ed, unthinking behavior rather
than delibp1·at<> attempt to or a delibPrate action of killing
ltrr." (11 -454)
A long this same line, the psychiatrist stated that
t11P defondant was suffering from a mental disease which
1rnuld JH'<>vent him from controlling impulses, (T-454)
to wit: a ps~·chosis which he had over a period of several
W\·Ph in whieh irnpnlses were not controlled. (T-454) The
ch·fendant's ability to discern the difference between right
nnd wrong was rnarkPdl:v impaired, (T-456) i.e., it was
closc'r to )wing- destroyed than it would be to being intact.
('l'--t~fi) OtllPr fads will he hronght out during the course
nf m·gm1wnt.
POINT I

nr

Tfrn EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE VERDICT

~!UHDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE IN LIGHT OF THE

11
UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE PSYCHIATRIST THAT
THE DEFENDANT WAS INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE
ALLEGED ACT.

The appellant respectifully submits that the evidence
adduced at trial hy the defendant as to the defendant's
insanity at the time of the offense was not rehutted hy
the prost>cution so as to sustain the lrnrden of the prosecution to prove the defendant was sane at the time of
the off ensP beyond a reasonable doubt.
The test of legal insanity in the State of Utah is a
combination of the M'N aughten's rule and the irresistih!I'
impulse rnle, to wit: that at th<' time of the act, tlw accnsrJ
was lahoring undPr a ddL·ct of rea;.;on, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the naturt> and quality of tl11'
act he was doing, or, if he did know, that he did not knmr
he was doing what was wrong; or that lw was under an
impnlse of such a magnit11de as to override reason an<l
judgment and obliteratP tlte S(~nse of right and \rrong
State 1J. Poitlson, 14 Utah 2d 213, 381 P. 2d 93 (1963):
State 1j. Green, 78 Utah 5SO, G P. 2d 177 ( 1931)
In the trial of a criminal cast>, thc•re exists a presnnw
tion of sanity at the time of th<> allt>p.;ed act. Stolt' 1.
Green, supra. This presmnption, ho\\'ever, gin,•s wa)' anu
is overcome by evid('l1C(' knding to provv insanit)" S/o/,
v. Green, suvra. H is inemulwnt upon th<> d<'frndant t11
bring fon\·ard <'YidencP in support of justification or "1
cnsP. State v. l'acos, -1-0 Utnl1 lW, 1~0 P. J,:!}'i (Hl 1 ). \\1

1

1

"'
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the ddendant introduces some evidence to raise the issue
oJ' insanity, his sanity at the time of the offense becomes
an element of the crime, which, like all other elements of
thr rrimc', must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable donbt. Wright v. United States, 250 F. 2d 4 (D.C.
Circuit 1957). The defendant need not establish insanity
hy the preponderance of evidence before he is entitled
to avail himself of the defense of insanity. State v. Green,
sHJirri. As this Court in State v. Vacos, supra, stated:
"All that he is required to do is to produce
t:iufficient f:vidence of jnstifcation or excuse,
which, then considered with all the other evidence
in tlw case, will create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jurors whether the homicide was
justified or excusable or not."
The burden on the prosecution is clear. ·where the
e,·id<'nce submitted by the defendant tends to establish
insanity at the time of the act, the prosecutor bears the
burden to convince the jnry, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant was not insane. This burden must be
nwt by evidence independent of and uninflunced by the
l11'<'snmption of sanity. State v. Green, supra. The sanity
of tlw defrndant becomes a jury question unassisted by
any presnmption and the matter must be decided upon
lhe w<->ight of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
State t·. Grren, supra.
,\s background information, this Court should be
11

1 :in,

111at a notice of the intent

to rely upon the defense
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of insanity was filed prior to trial. Pursuant to thi.,
notice, two alienists weTe a11pointed by the Court to
examine the ddendant rwrsrnrnt to Utah procedure. Fta:i
Code Annotated (1%3) 77-22-lG, 77-48-2 (as a11wnded).
Doctors Lonis G. Moench and ·William D. PacT,
psychiatrists, were clnly a1)pointed. ( rr-5) Each per.
formed a mental statns examination independently of
each other.
After the examinations, a mental lwaring '"as hchl
before the Honorable Ste·wart M. Hanson on Jul;; H
196G, where in Dr. Louis G. 1\focnch, \ms called hy tlw
State to testify. Cl.1-572) After, testifyinp; that the de·
f endan t \ms competent to stand tri a 1, ( ':i'-573) the lo\nr
conrt pc~rmitted defense counsel to examine with rt>gard
to mf'ntal condition at the time of the trial over oh.i<'diou
of the prosecutor. Doctor 1\foPneh stated that in hii
opinion the defendant was probably insane at the time
of the alleged crime (T-575); forther, that dne to the
defendant's mental condition, he was not aware of tlw
nature and quality of the aet at the commission of tlw
act; (T-575) furtlwr, that tlH' cfofrndrmt, clue to his mental
condition, was nnable to distinguish hetween tlte rightnci;
and 'vrongness of his act. ('r-57G) On qnestioning hy th('
prosecutor, t1;e psyehia tri st t('S ti fiod tlia t he fonnd t]H'
defrndant to 1w of low llH'ntalit?. (rl'-580)
It was fnrther poinh'd ont thal at i11c: tirn<' n1 tii:
act tlw (lefoncbnt 1Yai; suffrr:n;.:; from nn ":H'11k di,
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::ori a ti ve reaction." ( T-585) It was the opinion of Doctor
~Ioeneh that the defendant's judgment and his capacity
to make• a choice as to kill or not to kill '.Vas very seriously
iwpaired at the time of the act; moreover, the defendant's ·will power to chose the right from the wrong was
:;eriousl:'; impaired, though not completely lost. (T-585)
Similar1)T, the Doctor's opinion indicated that the defendant's capacity to formulate any plan, design or
intrntion to kill \Yas "very, very seriously impaired,"
although lw could not say it was absent. (T-585)

In the light of this type of tPstimony at the mental
hearing, the defendant W(~nt to trial for murder in the
first d(•gree. After the prosecution had rested, the defendant called Doctors Louis G. Moench and William D.
Pace as defense witnesses. Dr. Louis G. Moench stated
that the defendant was snffrring from a temporary
insanity at th(~ time of the shooting and this temporary
iHsanity was dl•scribed as "acute associative relation."
1'his was defined as representing a dissociation or separation of a person's awareness of reality from reality and
a dissociation and separation of his thinking, feeling,
rrml acting, so that they are not entirely coordinated.
(T-3~G) Further, it was his opinion that the defendant
wa~ insane and that his knowledgP of the rightness or
1n on;.i;11c•0s was seriously impaired as was his awareness
ril' Uw natnre and quality of his acts and his capacity
t 1 ndlit·n· to the i·ight. (T-398) He unhesitantly stated
!l1n1 [11(' (kfrm1m1t l\'OnlJ have committed the act in the
1

lG
presence of a policeman with guns drawn. (T-3DS) Mon
over, the defendant's capacity to form a s1wcific inh·nt tu
kill or to mah a choice to kill or not to kill or to d(·wlup
the intent to crPak gr('at hodily injury was Sl'l'ion~li
impaired, though not impossible. ('l'-431-432)

Dr. -William D. Pace further s111istantiatc•tl Doctor
Moench's opinions. Doctor Pace fonntl the tlef endant to
be psychotic at the time of the commission of the act.
(T-43G) The defendant could not make the distinction
b(,tW('t~n
right and wrongness of tlw act according to
law and morals and that d1w to tlw "mental illm•ss," tlii
defendant lacked the capacity to d<>lilwrate and plan to
kill. ('!1-438) Doctor Pace conc-nrred with Doctor l\Iorncl1
with regard to the policc•-presenc< t0st. ('l'-450) On erosi
examination, he describc tlw mental ilhwss or disease Di
bing disorganized, unthinking behavior ratlwr than a
deliberate attempt to or d<'libcrate action of killing tl:
victim. (T-454) rrhe dPfrndant was snffering· f1'tllll ,1
mPn'ml disease which prevc ni1•d him from C'ontrnllin~
impnlsc•s. ( T-454)
1

1

:-;

1

1

After the testimony aml cross-examination of tl1•
psychiatrists antl anothPl' lay ·wit1wss, the def011:.;0 n•sted.
The prosecution did not pn•s('nt an>· tcstirnony rrlrnttin~
the e\·idenc<~ adclucf'u from tl1e ps,whiatrists Y»i1h n·g·ari:
to the defrndanfs mental condition at tltc• 1i1:H· of tl 1•
commission of the offensP.
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It is

that the prosecution clearly failed to
prrsent proof b0yond a n~asonable donbt as to the defendant's insan;ty. Cross-examination of the psychiatrist
callPcl h.'· the defendant yielded no meaningful fruit for
the pros1c~cution. Rather, the cross-examination fnrther
affirnwd the ps.'·chiatrist's testirnon.'·· There was no
medical tPstimony whatsoever to exclude the hypothesis
0f insanity, nor was th<'re any rebutting of non-expert
!t•stimony. Under such circumstances, the Federal Court
has l1Pld that as a mattrr of law a reasonable doubt was
c·n·ab-•(1. 800 Dougla~ v. United States, 239 F. 2d 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1!J5G)
~mbmittPtl

'J1 l1is court has made a similar pronouncement in
Stnt<'. 1:. Brnwn, 3G Utah 46, 102 P. G41, 24 L.R.A., No. S.
5-l:f"> (1900) wherein the defense of insanity was raised and
th0 testimony of mental unsoundness was undisputed and
thn0 was no Pvidence of sanity. This court aptly noted:

"1-'lwre, no doubt, may be instances where the
evidence offered by the defendant upon the
question of his sanity is so weak and inconclusive
that the state may ·well insist upon the presumption of sanity and thns need not offer any evidence
in rebuttal ~f defendant's evidence upon the question. Could it he said, however, that this is so in
all instances because it mav be so in some¥ It
~wPms to us that this case offers a striking illus1ration that this cannot be so . . . . counsel for
the• state contends that the jury was authorized
lo tak0 into consideration defendant's acts and
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condnct lwforp and at the time lie committPd tJ 1,
offrns<': that in doing what h<' did l1is acts SP!:'llH,1!
rational. In otlH•r words that th0 dPfondant aell'd
as otlwrs gnilt_\· of like aeis ordinarily do when]:,
committed the forg<•ri<>s. Ifrnc0 the ;jmy \nrl'
;jnstifi<'d in finding him guilty. It se<•rns to 11 ,,
howevPr, that wh<'n his acts are analyzed thP1
. ' '
hard].\· snpport this cont<>ntion." :lG Utah at JI.

5:5, 5G.

In speaking of th<' 1m·smnption of sanit_\·, this conn
noted in Slate 1:. Hrow11, s111Jra, that th(> sbtP is not l'i'·
(ftlin•d to adtlne<' any <'Yid<•ncP tliat tl1<> (lf>frncbnt \':~·
sane, since the presmnption of sanity mak<>s a pri1111:
facic casP in that issw>. This conrt \';(>nt fnl'llwr a11il
stakcl:
"Dnt after the appdlant by an overwhelming ma,,
of <•viclcnce, had r<>lmtfrd the pn•smnptions 111
sanity, the jury is not a11tl10riz<_•d to arhitrarih
disregard the eyiclencP of insanity, all of \\'hici1
was in dfrct, conc<>df'd b.\· the State, to ht> tn11
and makP a finding basPd i1pon a presm11pti1 11
which had been ent in•lv on•rcollH'. When this pn·
sumption ·was <ff<'l'Cllll;c•, there \\·as ahsolntPly ll
evidence to snpport the n•rdict, for the n•D}Oti
that, avart from foe lH'l'Sl!mption of insanii:>', t)11
<>videncP upon this is~me is all one wa:·, nnd 1'
cl<'arl_\· to the (']'fret that the app<'llant ·was insan
'l'Jw presumption was therdore ovc:rconH', lw:-·ow
any donht. U p011 tl1is qti('sbm, tlt<'l'<' is 110 r11 11 '
for rc•a;.;onahl(• mPn to diffrr. \Vt' Y<·11h1n• to asH' 1,
that no onc• wl10 is tmllia:--:<•d <'an r<'acl Pw n·enri:
in this en.SP witl10nt ani\'ing at t]](• :::a11H' cir:!
ch•sion." :i1; lTtn!t at p. ris.
1

11

1
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S('(' Fri!)illana v. U11itcd Slates, 307 F. 2d 665;
[]rock v. United States, ________ F. 2d ________ 5th Cir. 1967.

.\l~o,

Tlir·:-:e F<·deral Courts held that the government had
i'ail1•d to sustain its lmrd('n of proof and that a directed
11,rdict should han~ bet·n entc~red finding the defendant
nnt ;:;·nilt~- li~- l'Pason of insanity.

In TVright v. United Statrs, 250 F. 2d 4, 7 (D.C. Cir.
rn:i7), the government's only evidence to sustain its
ln1rc1Pn of proving b<.•yond a reasonable doubt that the
rli-l'<>nclant was sam' ·was the testimony of two policemen
n,; op1>osPd to the t0stimony of eleven psychiatrists as to
tliP ckfrndant's iusanity. The court again held that the
gowrmnmt had failed to sustain its burden. Moreover,
tliP comt n•jeded the governnwnt's contention that some
nf' tlu· dodors ('XJ1rt>ssed their opinions in varying degrees
ol' i1rnhaliility hy stating that the opinion to which psyd1iatrist's kstifi<>s neetl only be "the type of clinical
r1pi11icnrn lw is accustomed to form and to rely upon in the
pr<Lcti<·1· of lt:s profession." It need not consist of "math1·11:atieal clvrnonstrahle certainties." Blunt v. United
Stufr's, :244 F'. 2d i3;J5, 36-1 (19:'57).
Fllrtlwr support for the appellant's position in the
1 dc 1.' at bar is fonnd in :llcl\cnz:ie v. United States, 266
l·'. ~<1 5:!-± (10th Cir. 1959) and Pollard v. United States,
~,~~, F. :!d 430, (Gth Cir. 19GO). In the former case, the
:11>,<>rn t ion off erecl no medical testimony, but relied en'. i; - !~· 1ipon the testimony of non-expert witnesses to
1

·whom th~' dc'frnchnt ·was a strang<'r. ThP snhstnncL' 11•
the fostirnon>' of th<•sc '"·itnessPs was that they ohsen-":
nothing mrnsnal or abnormal ahont tl1e defrndant iin
mediately Jwfore and after the alleged crime. rrhe p1,rt
eral Conrt held that this evid(•nce> was insnfficient. Jfr.
KcnziP v. Unit<'d States, s1111rn, at 458-459.
In the instant case, no expert or non-expert trstimo1r
of witnessPs was addnc0d by tlw prosecution. Rather, tl:e
pros(~cntion relied sole]~- u11on cross-examination of tit,
State appointed psychiatrists who were called upr'ir
by the defense .. It is argued that this cross-examinatio11
was inadvquate to snstain the prm;ecntion's burden of
provrng the d<'frndant's snnit>- beyond a r<'asonal1!
douht.

1•

The appellant respectfnlly snbmits tliat the nnre
butted evidence as to the insanity of the ddendant at tlii
time of the all0gc'd act warrants a reversal of his fir·
deo-n•e
murdPr conviction and an order bY. this com!
b
remanding the case with dir<'ctions to find the dPfrndaur'
not guilty. In the altc'rnativP, the appellant reqnests th:!·
the evid<'nce as to the d<'frndant's rnrntal cayiahilities fM
possessing the necessary mental frame of mind ~o <:·
to ddihcrak and prcnwclitate> tlw ad of killing w:1~ sul
ficicnt to rc'dllCl' tlw erimP to Mmdur in t11<' SPcon,!
Dl'gree. Statr r. Grcn1, 78 Utah 5:m, G P. 2d 177 (t9:l!):
State L Kruchten, ]()1 Ariz. 1~:G, -117 P. 2d ;)]() (1911:1!
State 1:. DlcAlli,dr-r, 41 N ..T. :3-t2. 1% A'.!. /.';G.
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In People v. Wolff, 40 Cal. Rptr, 271, 394 P. 2d 959
(19G4), tlH' California court reduced the conviction of

first degree murder to second degree murder. This was
aecomplished due to the evidence of the defendant's
youth and undisputed mental illness which limited the
extent to which the defendant could maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act.
In the instant case, the defendant was found to be of low
mentality and at the time of the act was suffering from
an "acute dissociative reaction" which very seriously
impaired the defendant's judgment and his capacity to
make the choice as to kill or not to kill and further, the
defendant's capacity to formulate any plan, design or
intention to kill was "very, very seriously impaired."
'rlw evidence would not support a conviction for first
drgrc(> murder.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE DENIAL OF PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INSPECTION OF WRITTEN STATE~IENTS OF WITNESSES.

The defense filed a motion for a Bill of Particulars
on Jurn~ (), 1966. This was answered by the prosecuting
att01ney on June 16, the Saturday before trial. The
answer c·ontained the names and addresses of some 33
:-;tatc's ·witnesses. (T-13, 14) The prosecutor refused to
uns\\'Pr def<.>ndant's requested question No. 5 which
>'ta tPfl :
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"5. -Whether the State has any written state11wm
of any of the witnesses obtained in the investi'''
tion of the charge. If so, attach a copy of e:
same." (T-3)
The point on appeal deals specificall>' with the rigl
of the defendant to discon-ry in criminal aetions. It is tl1
defendant's contPntion that the denial of the right of di,
covery in the instant case deprives the defendant of !t1:
right to full and complete confrontation with witnrsir
against him, to be informed of the natnrc and canse
the accusation, to have the assistance of couns<->l for J1idefense, as gnarantPed by the Sixth Amendment of tb
United States Constitntion as mad~ applicable to tb
states through the Fonrth Amcndnwnt and Articlr i.
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

•
1

Tlie pertinent statute with which this point is CUi1
cerned is found in Utah Code Annotated (195:1) §77-~l-l1
"(1) ·when an information or indictment charg~i
an offense in accordance with the provisions o:
section 77-21-8, but fails to inform the defendan:
of the particulars of the offpnse, snfficirntly _1'
enable him to pn-'parP his defrnsr, or to give luw
such information as he is entitled to under tlw
Constitution of this state, tlie conrt may, of it'
mvn motion, and shall at the request of the d'.
fondant, onlnr tlw 1n·o:wcnting attorney io fnrn''~
a bill of partic11lars containing sncll infonnatir1"
as may be nrr'l'l-;sa17 for t h('s<' pnrposPs; or ti
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prosecuting attorney may of his own motion furnish snch bill of particulars.
(2) vVhen the court deems it to be in the interest
of justice that facts not set out in the information
or indictment or in any previous hill of particulars
shonld be furnished to the defendant, it may order
tl1<c; prosecuting attorney to furnish a bill of particulars containing snch facts. In determining
whether such facts and, if so, what facts, should be
so furnished, the court shall consider the whole
n•cord and the entire course of the proceedings
against the defendant.
(3) Supplemental bills of particulars or a new bill
may be ordered by the court or furnished voluntarily nnder the conditions above stated.
( 4) Each supplemental bill shall operate to amend
any and all previous bills and a new bill shall
supersede any previous bill.
( 5) vVhen any bill of particulars is furnished it
shall be filed of record and a copy of such bill be
giwn to the defendant.
In raising the issue of discovery, the appellant is not
unmindful of the limitrd precedent which finds itself in
Staff· v. Jameson, 103 Utah, 129, 134 P. 2d 173 (1943)
and State ·v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P. 2d 852 (1950).
The hill of particulars need not plead matters of evidence
n11 1· was it intPnded as a devise to compel the prosecution
gi,·p tlw accust>d person a preview of the evidence
:

11
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which the State relies to sustain the charge. It is tlw a1,
pellant's conkntion that these pn•cedents should lw 1.,
examined in light of tlw trend in cliscowry in crirnin;.
cases.

Tlw position of the appellant is not without authorit:
rn the State of Utah. In a landmark case, this Cour
allowed pre-trial discov('l'Y of grand jnry minutes. l'tni
v. F aitx, 9 Utah 350, 345 P. 2d 18() ( 1959). rn](~ majorit\
sveaking through Chief .Jnstice Crockett avtly i1ointeclo11
that the pnrpose of a criminal trial is not to com·ict Jrn·
to seek the truth and administer justict>, " ... trnth sl1011l1!
have nothing to frar from light." 9 Utah at 355. HaYin:
admitted that tlw trial comt has discretion to permit ti
use of grand jury tt>stimon:v for irnpPaclmwnt at the ti111
of trial, the majority rxkndt>d this procPss to prP-tri::
inspection aft('r scrutiny hy the trial jndgr. 'J'h<> rational,
st>emed to lie in th(' cnmbnsome procrdnre which woul !
prevail if pre-trial disclosure WPre not permitted. l\or
would it appear that any fonndation as to whether tL,
prior testimony was inconsistPnt need be~ laid for t]1e(
pre-trial disco~ery since~ it is oln·ions t11at thr <lden"'
would kno\Y wlwtlwr th Pr<' was an inconsiskncv nnles' L'
knows what the prior tt>stimony was and it is nnlikel1
that a \Vitness wonlcl volnntaril>' rcn·al that hP l1aii
iire,·iousl>· testifir>d diffrrmtl>·· .!\or was thr majnrit~:
1

1

opinion concenwd with fornishing- the ddc•ndant "itli •·
basis for Jll"<'parntion of pPrjill'cd t(•stimon~·, noting !11•1
if thP dPfrndant will Pnµ;ag-(' in s11d1 b:wfnl 111acllinntini·
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elenwnt is not going to prevent it and other
procrRsPs of law must cope with such unlawful conduct. 9
rtah at 353.
thP

tii11P

The most recent cases dealing with discovery in
ffiminal cases are compiled in 7 ALR2d 8. Although it is
stakd in that annotation that discovery is not a matter
of right, the annotation further reveals that a growing
nnmber of jurisdictions have extended pre-trial discovery
in criminal cases based npon trial court's discretion. 7
_\LR 8rc. 5, p. 3G.

The trial conrt <:>nhanced the error when he refused
'.o permit defense counsel to inspect the prior statement
of Edith Larson, state's witness, for the purpose of cross"~amination dnring the course of trial. (T-304) Thereafter, defense counsel indicated that the defendant is
entitled to see any written reports that were given by any
1ritnPsses in this case that are in the possession of the
Di,triet Attorney's Office for pnrpose of cross-examination. (T-134) This was refused by the District
_\ttorrn7 and sustained by the trial court. ( T-135) Thereafter, a motion for mistrial was made and overruled.
IT-134) Prior ·written statments of Joyce Rich, another
>t:1t<>\.; witness was requested and denied. (T-321, 324)
\111n•oy<'r, the request for prior statements, unsigned,
1
>1' 11i('liar<l L. Allen, State's eye witness, was initially
11
·i11~1:.·d h:· the trial court. (T-377) After a conference
111
1·lrnmh1·1·s, ,\'lterein it was pointed out to the court that
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the transcript of the rirPliminary hearing had not be~n
prepared and that the ans,n•r to the bill of iiarticnhm
was providPd on the Satnrday before trial (a period of
two days), dt>fense c01msel '"'a:; pennitkd to rrad tl11
prior statement in clmrnbers, but was not rwnnitktl to
ha\'e access to t1w statement dnring cross-examination.
(T-385) After the conrt's n1ling on the prior statement
of .T oyce Rich, defonst~ conns~·l deemed it futile to maki
any further requests for inspection of prior statemenh
of any other state's witnesses, inclnding Mary Lon Lemon
\\-ho was a critical witnc-ss to c-stahlish premeditati011 ·
After the state rested, dPfrns<~ c01rnsel n•qlwsted mi ill
camera inspection of tlw District Attorney's fih,~~ ,r]1iel1
was dPnied. ( T-384)
There is no question that prior stakrnents arc• to Le
made availabh~ to defense counsel after the witne::;s ha<:
testified for tlw puq)()se of cross-examination. Uf11li 1 .
Faux, supra. This is so withorit a reqnin•mcnt of ePtal
lishing- that in inconsistency exists. Jenck v. U11if1il
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Utal1 L Faux, supra; Cami' ,
ucll v. United States, 3G•"5 U.S. 85 (19Gl); Pco1;le v. Chap-,
man, 52 Cal 2d 95, 338 P. 2d 428 (1~59); Funk r. Su1Jr'rior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P 2d 59~1 (1059); People c.
Estrada, 5-± (\d. 2d 713, :15Ci P. 2d G-±1(19Ci0),1yll<•reintl:e
1

court stated:
"}:i-;ithcr before or dnrin~ t11c trial, the accn,cil
can eornn<•l tlw 1wopl<' to prodtw<' t1w writk 11
•
•
1 t• P' 111
statement; of a pro::><'ent1on
\\·d1wss n• a lll,-.

.
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matt0rs covered in ttistimony. In laying a foundation for production, the accused is not required
to show the document was signed by a witness
or otherwise acknowledge by him as accurate or
that there is any inconsistency between the statement and the testimony of the witness . . ( citations omitted) The value of obtaining snch a
statement is that it may contain contradictions of
the testimony of the witness, may omit facts
r<>lated by him at the trial, or may reveal a contrast in emphasis placed on the same facts. A
d<>fendant is not ordinarily in a position to show
snch mattPrs nntil he has seen the statement."
A policy considt>ration of constitutional purportions
:;honld he krpt in mind in assessing the defendant's right
to prt>-trial discovery in a criminal case. The United
States ~npremti Court has said in Brady v. Maryland,

"-" l'S
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"\Ve now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
l'l'qnest violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespectin of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87.

It is submitted that in order to avoid the subsequent
1la11gc'r of an impropt>r suppression, the trial court should
h1· lilwra l in allowing discoyery in criminal cases. This
dangPr would be minimized if discovery in the manner
11 it' in l't'tpwskd is permitted. This discovery should be
''\]land<'<l to prrmit in camera inspection by the court of
1

the prosecutor's file at or before the end of the prol'l~cn
tion\; case. FainH•ss and efficic'ncy n•qaire that t]i,

}ll'OS(•cntion n·vt·al rnakria! eYiclencL' of substantive Yah:"

to the defense. '1'11<' fa_;Jure of tlw trial court to pernu:
inspeetion of tlw prior statPmPnts <'i'frctinly dPni('d tlie

aprwllant the right to confront tlH' ·witrn'ss<>s, right t0
<'f°fectivt' com1s<'l, and right to a fair trial. Failnru to grant
pre-trial inspection arnl trial ins1wction is clc>arl.\· pn',ju
dicial and revcrsihle t'l'l'or.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING TESTIMONY OF
THE DEFANDANT'S BAD REPUTATION WITHOUT THE
SAME BEING PUT IN ISSUE BY THE DEFENDANT.

rr1w trial court perniittPd 1Jar_'I· Lon LPmon, a stat~';
w;tnC'ss, to tPstify to a co1n-<·rsation had with defendan'
a few hmns before the shootiiig. (rl'<3"18) At ahont G:l11.

1

1un. on t11e night of the shooting·, sltc stak<l that tl1

1

ddPEdant had calll'd lH'l' a11d askt'd lll'l" for a date. SI
refwwd stating, "l said I liuH"d l\(' didn't haw to0 goo l
of charncter rPfen•nee~; to he going ont with at that tiuw."
(T-350) This tPstimon_'I· \ms admitt(•d oyer ell-fen.·,
rom1sel's ohjc~ction. ('i,-:H9, :)50) Tt \ms apparent fru11
tlw '"-itn('·SS<'S prior qtwstions and nm;\\'(·rs that sl1c· li:i1
rt'CC'ivcd som0 inl'orwat ion rm:c1·1·11ing- tl:0 rll•fpmlnnt':
n 1mtation from lwr hrot11n-in-lnw, \d10 \Yas the d"pu~
slH·riff, Barr Pdns1·11. Ill• tPsti l'i('d tl1•lt frnrn inl' 11 nn:
tion lTC('iY('(l frnw his y.-i!'<', \\-l:o li•it1 np]>'.ll'<'l11 [y tnlli''
1

1
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to :Mary Lou Lemon, he instrncted Deputy Higgins to

patrol Mary Lon Lemon's house. 11 his information was
i't>l'l'ived and the instructions were given some 4 hours
prior to the shooting. (T-203) Further, he testified that
lie also kept a lookout for the defendant. (T-204) Defrndant's objections and motions to strike were overrnled.
'rlte obvious direction in this line of questioning by
the prosecutor ·was to place before the jury the inference
that tlw defendant was of bad character, evil minded and
dangerous to such an extent as to require a protective
nwmmre to be instituted. This is clearly prejudicial to
lhl' ddendant. The witnesses' conduct in establishing protrrtive measures for a third party has no probative value
in establishing the defendant's mental frame of mind
\(nrnrd the deceased. This assertive conduct by the deputy
cheriff was clearly detrimental to and in derogation of
Wt>ll-fotmdPd principles that the state cannot show the
liad clinraeter of the accused until the accused has raised
tlH, issue by offering evidence of good character. State v.
Houge11scn, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229 (1936); State v.
1'1wmpson, 58 Utah 291, 199 P. 161, 38 ALR 697 (1921);
2~ Arn. ,Jnr. Sec. 3'10. Testimony which has the direct
f•ff'ect of showing the cruel and evil nature of the accused
is to lw condemned. People v. Gougas, 410 Ill. 235, 102
'~ E. '.?d 152, 28 ALR 2d 852 (1951) The rationale for the
n1lv is clParly to prevent the deep tendency of human
11 ahm· to rmnish, not lwcanse the accused is guilty, but

lwcausP h<> is a lmd man. 'l'lw rational(• is <'qnally a]Jpiil'
al1le to th<' cas<' nt har.
'l'h(~

kstirnony of Barr PdPrsl'n as to his as.s(·l'tin

condnet in insfrucfo1g anotlHT d\•1mty sh<>riJ'f to patrril
::\ lan·
Lon Lemon's 11 o t tS(' was e!Parl •v irnrna turia I Hill!
•
ilTPJt~Yant

I

as to iSSll<' of' gniJt 01' il1JJO('('J1C<' of tJH' 0Jioot-

ing· of B(·rnice King. This conduct was solicited h>- th1·
pros<·cntion sol<'ly to show the jury tliat in 01w rnan'1
rn ind the accnsl'd was a p<~rson to lw \•;a td1Pd and 11r11tPcted against, to ·wit: tl:at he wa:o: a ]Wl'son of potPnti:il)

clang<•rnus charact<'r. l t 1--J1ould lH• kPpt i11 mind thnt Iii,,
t<•stimony \\'US furthur iin·jndiced cltw to th<> fad that 111
·was a d<'pnty sl1<•riff and on<' of th<• innstigating offo.1•r'
}.[orPovN, Mary Lon LPn10n's tPstim011~· falls witlii11 ():,
sanH · flayor as Barr Pd(•rs<•n 's.

rwnnitted to tPstify that she <lidn't "·ant to
go ont ·with th<• al'l'l1S(•d lw('ans<· h<· didn't h:we "go1 1 :
character n•frn•nr<'S." Cl\'a r I;;, t Iii s kstimony \\'H.~ ll'
ot'frn•d as the trnth of lit<, rnalt\·r as:wrte<l nml 1lwn·f1w
1\·as not }Jf'arc<n~·. 'l'li<' appm·<·nt r<>ason for pnmiHiil~
said frstirnon~· whith, in eil'(•ct, r<'lll'PSC'nts a eoncl11~::.1 1
on the part of the witiw~;s, was that it was a ,·1·rb111 ad.
Sli<~ \\'tlS

1

i.('., the stak~1wnt 1\·a~; offl'red as 1•v!d1·11('l' of n l'at'
direct!~· obSC'l'V<'d J>y a \1:it11<•:'>S OJ' to sltOW the fad of ti''
ktvi11g 1w<'ll rnad1•. 1 \Yknton\; ( 'rirninal E\·id<·M<'.
~;)/. Tlt;s \'1 r;nJ ::w1 1,\·n:' s:tli;11it h·d to slio\1· tliP d1·<·inn11t·
sink nf i;1i11d <111<1 illmtr:"tfr.\l to 1)H· j1ir:: t'.:a( c<lw !'I'll '.li:

1

the defrndant \Vas not a fit person to be associated with.
In turn, the jury viewed her testimony as imputing a bad
clrn.racter and therefore the testimony was objectionable
under the rule previously announced. The effect of her
tstirnony is more prejudicial when it is submitted to the
jnr>· without any limiting instructions hy the trial court
not to consider the statements of Mary Lou Lemon as
the truth of the matter stated. Consequently, the jury was
at libert>T to consider her testimony in any manner which
tlwy chose to the detriment of the ddendant, who did
not take the stand. The net effect of permitting her
kstimon)· to stand was to place upon the defendant by
cro~s-examination or by independent evidence the added
burden of negating the direct inference of bad character
with regard to the defendant's relationship with Mary
Lou Lemon. ri 1 his burden was improperly placed upon
tlw d0fondant and consequently, the defendant chose not
to lll<'Pi it during the trial. To permit such testimony
\ras clearly prejudicial to the defendant in that it permith•d thP jury to consider one person's opinion as to the
charactc•r of the defendant on an issue solely foreign to
the is:-;nes at hand and further, it embedded an inference
in the mind of the jury which cast doubt on the defenrlant's character, which inference could not be refuted
f'Xc1)pt hy placing the defendant on the stand thereby
\·iolating his rights under the Fifth Amendment and to
have thp issue of guilt or innocence determined by a fair
t ]' i:i l.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING THE DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES TO TESTIFY AS TO THE DE
FENDANT'S MENTAL CONDITION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

The defendant called Dnane Brinkerhoff as a defense
witness. This witiwss testified that he had a conversation
with the ddendant on~r the phon<' about two hours afte1
the commission of the offense. (T-48G) The conversation
lasted for a period of 20 minutes and the defendant\
\·oice aprwared sharper, q uickC'r and excited. ( T-±Sii
'rhP dc>fc>nsc> tlwn m;k('CT what this witness said to tk
defendant. The olijection was snstai1wd by the trial com1
on the basis that the witness's conversation to the accnsril
was hearsay. (T-488) Th<~ objection was sustaiMd after
an offer of proof ·was rn:.Hl<'. 'rlw offrr 1vas not made a
part of the reco1·d. ('r-487)
The appellant snhmits that tht' trial court commilte1l
prejudicial error in flnstaining th<~ prosecutor's ob;jertloi'
as to what the "·itness sa;cl to the d<:>fonda11t two hmm
after tlte sl10otii1g. '\Yltat this witnPss said to the rk
fendant is clearly not hearsay. Hearsay in its most simple
form has been defined as evidence which a given witnet>
offers in court wh:c-h is 11ot h:isecl npon his own personal
lmowledge a11d 1Yhich is off c>r('d as proof of the matter
stated lH'l'C'in. 1 \Vharton, Sr'c. 2-hD. \Y1rnt Mr. Duani
Brinkerhoff said to foe accur,<'d is clearly \\'itltin hi;
rwrsoaal knowJ<.dg-(~. Ik w011ld kff(' lwen l<'f;tifying n;
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to what he said, not ·what anyone else had related to him.
Although not a matter of record, Mr. Brinkerhoff would
Ji;n·e testified that he told the accused that he was sick
and that he needed the help of a doctor.
Testimony of a lay witness who is acquainted with
the accnsed is competent evidence to establish the defendant's state of insanity. State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46,
102 P. 641 (1909) In the Brown case, some fourteen
defense lay witnesses were permitted to testify that the
rlefendant at the time of the alleged offense was mentally
nnhalanced. In the instant case, the lay testimony of Mr.
Duane Brinkerhoff was admissible and probative to the
is~ue of insanity which was the sole defense relied upon
hy the defense. His testimony was corrobative of the
testimony of Dr. Louis G. Moench and Dr. William D.
Pacr. For the trial court to deny the testimony of a lay
1ritness was to deny the defendant the constitutional right
to lian; witnesst>s called in his behalf and to testify to all
mattl'rs pertinent to the issue within the rnles of evidence.
CONCLUSION
'11 he appellant res1wctfnlly submits that points herein
prerwnted to this Court warrants a reversal of the conYietion of First Degree :Murder. The prosecution has
faild to meet the burden of proving the sanity of the
rH"t'llUant b<'yond a reasonable doubt by failing to pre·'''ni in1l('JlPlld('nt evidence of the defendant's sanity. The

instant case illustrates the frustrations of defense counsel
in presenting a legitimate and supportable defense of
insanity only to have the law and facts ignored bY tlw
jury. The criminal case onght not to depend upon the
rhetoric of counsel, bnt should de>pend upon the prP~en
tation of evidence to the jury, giving defense counsel
reasonable opportunity to confront witnesses. Discorny
of the nature sought in the instant case will only enhance the criminal process by eliminating the cat and
mouse tactics of counsel. Movements tovrnrd the ultimate
end of seeking the truth is the proper fnnction of a
criminal trial.
Respectfull~'

submitted,
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